Access to the Courts: A Blueprint for Successful Litigation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by Charmatz, Marc & McRae, Antoinette
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender
and Class
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 7
Access to the Courts: A Blueprint for Successful
Litigation Under the Americans With Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act
Marc Charmatz
Antoinette McRae
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Disability Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more
information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc Charmatz, & Antoinette McRae, Access to the Courts: A Blueprint for Successful Litigation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act
and the Rehabilitation Act, 3 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender & Class 333 (2003).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol3/iss2/7
ACCESS TO THE COURTS: A BLUEPRINT FOR
SUCCESSFUL LITIGATION UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE REHABILITATION
ACT
MARC CHARMATZ AND ANTOINETTE MCRAE*
I. INTRODUCTION
For individuals with disabilities, "access to the courts" involves
more than hiring a lawyer, filing a complaint, or proceeding through the
numerous stages of the litigation process. "Access to the courts," in this
context, means finding an accessible parking place, getting up the steps,
opening courthouse doors, finding the courtroom, sitting at counsel
tables, entering the jury box, sitting on the bench, and communicating
effectively with judges, lawyers, courtroom personnel, and the jury. This
article explores the obligations of state and local courts to provide
reasonable modifications and auxiliary aids and services to ensure that
parties, witnesses, judges and lawyers, and jurors with disabilities are
guaranteed meaningful participation in judicial proceedings. These rights
have been strengthened through lawsuits based upon two key federal
statutes, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (section 504)1 and The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2
Since 1973, section 504 has prohibited discrimination on the basis
of disability by programs and activities that receive federal funds.3 The
statutory definition of "program or activity" is very broad.4 Section 504
is implemented by comprehensive regulations promulgated by federal
agencies. The regulations detail section 504 obligations for recipients of
* Marc Charmatz is a senior attorney with the National Association of the Deaf Law and
Advocacy Center in Silver Spring, Maryland. Mr. Charmatz is also an Adjunct Professor at the
University of Maryland School of Law, where he teaches the Civil Rights of Individuals with
Disabilities Seminar and Clinic. Antoinette McRae is a 2004 Juris Doctor Candidate at the
University of Maryland School of Law and a former student-attorney in the school's Civil Rights
of Persons with Disabilities Clinic.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
4. A "program or activity" includes "a department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or of a local government" that receives federal financial assistance
federally funded educational institutions; private entities and corporations; and health care,
housing, social service, or recreational organizations. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
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federal aid.5 For example, programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance must "evaluate and modify [their] policies and
practices that do not meet the [nondiscrimination] requirements., 6
Specifically, section 504 covers the operations of state and local courts
that receive federal financial assistance because such courts are
considered "instrumentalit[ies] of a State or of a local government." 7
Thus, courts are not permitted to exclude, deny benefits to, or
discriminate against an individual with a disability solely because of that
disability.8
The ADA, enacted on July 26, 1990,9 built on section 504 by
providing comprehensive anti-discrimination protection for individuals
with disabilities. The ADA's coverage is not limited to programs and
activities that receive federal financial assistance, but extends the anti-
discrimination mandate to covered employers under Title 1,10 all of the
functions of state and local governments under Title 11,11 and public
accommodations under Title 11,12 regardless of whether they receive
federal support. Some state and local courts may be covered under both
the ADA and section 504. In other words, state and local courts are
always covered under the ADA and are covered under section 504 when
they receive federal financial assistance.
Individuals seeking protection under the ADA and section 504
have met with some adversity in federal courts throughout the United
States. A core issue-the definition of an individual with a disability, i.e.
who is entitled to protection under both federal statutes, has been whittled
away by the United States Supreme Court.' 3 A survey by the American
Bar Association's Mental and Physical Disability Law Reporter of cases
5. 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-540 (2003).
6. 28 C.F.R. § 42.505(c)(1).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (b)(1)(A).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,630-31 (June 3, 1980).
9. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117(2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
13. See Toyota Motors Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S 184 (2002) (holding that
individual with carpal tunnel syndrome was not disabled because of her ability to perform manual
tasks in everyday life); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that
individuals with 20/200 uncorrected vision corrected with eyeglasses were not disabled);
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that individual with monocular
vision was not disabled); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that
individual with hypertension was not disabled). Butsee Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
(holding that individual who was HIV positive qualified as disabled under ADA); School Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that individual with tuberculosis qualified
as disabled under §504).
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brought under Title 114 reveals, "of 328 decisions that resolved the claim
(and have not been changed on appeal), 94.5 percent resulted in employer
wins and 5.5 percent in employee wins. 15 The United States Supreme
Court has further reduced the rights of employees with disabilities under
Title 1.16 The situation has become so grave that disability advocates are
attempting to have cases accepted for review by the United States
Supreme Court withdrawn.!
7
Perhaps one of the few areas where individuals with disabilities
have prevailed, at least for purposes of declaratory and injunctive relief,
is in Title I118 and section 504 cases dealing with "access to the courts."
The relative success by individuals with disabilities in these cases stems
from the statutory and regulatory language in both Title 1119 and section
504.20 The terms "reasonable modifications ' '21 and "auxiliary aids and
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). Title I of the ADA deals with discrimination on the
basis of disability in the context of employment, as opposed to Title II, which involves disability
discrimination in the context of the programs, services, and activities of public entities, i.e. state
and local governments.
15. Amy L. Albright, 2002 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 1-Survey Update,
27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 387 (2003). The ABA surveyed 442 cases; 309 cases
resulted in employer wins, 18 in employee wins, and 115 in decision in which the merits of the
claim were not resolved. Id. at 387. The Fourth Circuit heard thirty-two Title I cases in 2002. Id.
at 388. Employers won twenty-five of the cases on summary judgment and one case on the
merits. Id. Employees did not win one case, and in six cases there was no resolution. Id.
16. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that when an employer
requests an accommodation under Title I of the ADA that interferes with seniority rights, a
rebuttable presumption is created that the accommodation is not reasonable); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (holding that Title I of the ADA covers disabilities that pose
direct threats to one's own health); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(holding that states are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from monetary damages under
Title I of the ADA); Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Syss. Co., 298 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
grantedsub nom. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003) (considering whether Title I
of the ADA confers preferential rehire rights for employees lawfully terminated for misconduct,
such as illegal drug use).
17. Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1028
(2002). In Hason, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the first question in the writ
of certiorari - whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suit under Title II of the ADA for
denial of a medical license based on the applicant's mental illness. Med. Bd. of Cal. v. Hason,
537 U.S. 1028 (2002). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2002 WL 32101143 (Sept. 23,
2002). The Ninth Circuit had ruled that the applicant could sue the medical board because
Congress, in enacting Title II of the ADA, had validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Hason, 279 F.3d at 1171. See also Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
19. Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. §794 (2000).
21. "Reasonable modifications" may include modifications to "rules, policies, or practices."
See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
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services" 22 are linchpins enabling individuals with disabilities to have a
genuine opportunity to be present, participate, and enjoy the benefits of
court programs, activities, and services. 23 Additionally, courts have held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also protects
an individual's right to "access to the courts. 24
Part II of this article presents an overview of the federal statutes
and regulations that protect an individual's "access to the courts" rights,
focusing on Title II and section 504. In Part III, this article examines the
Constitutional framework that supports the right to "access to the courts."
Part IV examines federal cases where the above statutes were used to
protect the "access rights of individuals" with disabilities.
II. FEDERAL STATUTORY PROTECTION OF ACCESS TO STATE, LOCAL,
AND FEDERAL COURTS.
A. The ADA
In enacting the ADA, Congress entered specific findings and
purposes:
[I]ndividuals with disabilities .. . have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment... based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society. 2
5
Further, Congress found persons with disabilities "continually
encounter... [the] failure to make modifications to existing facilities,"
such as courthouses, and that discrimination against individuals
22. "Auxiliary aids and services" include "qualified interpreters... qualified readers, taped
texts ... acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and ... other similar services and
actions." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2000).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132. Under the ADA, public entities may not discriminate
against an individual with a disability who "with or without reasonable modifications ... or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt
of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. §
12131.
24. See, e.g., Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003) cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
2622 (2003).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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continued to exist in "access to public services.' ' 26 Moreover, "unlike
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race,
color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no
legal recourse to redress such discrimination., 27 The Act's purposes are
to provide a "national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities," to provide clear, strong, and
consistent enforcement standards, to ensure a central role for the federal
government in enforcing the Act, and to use the regulation of commerce
to protect persons with disabilities from discrimination.28
1. Title II of the ADA
Title II applies to all services, programs, and activities provided
or made available by public entities. Because section 504 covered only
programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance, the purpose
of Title II is to apply the anti-discrimination mandate to all services,
programs, and activities of state and local government regardless of the
receipt of federal financial assistance. Prior to enacting the ADA,
Congress heard evidence pertaining to the lack of protection for
individuals with disabilities in small towns who were discriminated
29
against in local government activities. Unfortunately, state and local
governments activities were "frequently the major activities" in these
towns, making the exclusion of individuals with disabilities a substantial
deprivation. 30 Until the enactment of Title II, these individuals had
virtually no legal protection because section 504 was inapplicable to
many small towns untouched by federal aid.3'
Title II applies to "public entities." This term is defined to mean:
"(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government."32  Title II also contains a broad definition of
"discrimination" that states: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
26. 42 U.S.C § 12101(a)(3), (5).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12104(b).
29. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 12-13 (1989) (testimony of Dr. Mary Flynn Fletcher).
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 12-13.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000).
2003]
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entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."33 Title II
defines "qualified individual with a disability" as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,
the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by a public entity.
34
The plain and simple language of Title II has direct bearing on
"access to the court" issues. Judges and lawyers, by the very nature of
their work, are "qualified." So, too, are parties and jurors "qualified,"
regardless of whether or not they appear in court voluntarily. The
services, programs, or activities of the courts are well known to all -
trials to adjudicate civil disputes, criminal proceedings to assess guilt or
innocence, parole and probation, etc. The terms signifying
"discrimination," i.e. exclusion from participation in and denial of
benefits, fit neatly when considering "access to the court" cases.
Title II does not define the term "reasonable modifications.,
35
Further, Title II does not, itself, define the term "auxiliary aids and
services." However, this term is defined in the "Definitions" Sections of
the ADA and the ADA regulations. The comprehensive definition of
auxiliary aids and services is a key legislative component in eliminating
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in "access to court"
cases. Otherwise, state and local governments could make an overly
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). The terms "participation in" and "benefits of' may not
apply in all court access cases. A defendant in a criminal or civil case may not understand that
there is a "benefit" in being in court. That person may not be a voluntary "participant." Yet, that
defendant, has a right not to be "subjected to discrimination" in dealings with the courts.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000). A similar definition is found in the ADA regulation. See
28 C.F.R. §35.104 (2003).
35. However, the term "reasonable accommodations" is defined in Title I of the ADA.
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include--
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustments or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
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simplistic argument that nondiscrimination only requires permitting an
individual with a disability inside a courthouse. State and local courts
must do more-they must ensure that there are effective "methods for
making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing
impairments... methods making visually delivered materials available to
individuals with visual impairments.. .and... other similar services and
actions. ' 36 For example, a court should provide sign language interpreter
services to ensure effective communication between the court and a deaf
individual. Finally, the "Definitions" Section of the ADA contains a
definition of the term "disability:" "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment." 37
The definition of "disability" has proven troublesome in a variety
of contexts, especially in employment cases. 38 Yet, in access to court
cases, 39 courts often have allowed claims to proceed on the ground that
the plaintiffs are disabled under federal law. This is so because the
plaintiffs in these cases are most often individuals who have mobility
impairments, or who are deaf or blind. These individuals have no
difficulty in overcoming the initial hurdle of showing a disability to
demonstrate their eligibility for protection under Title II and section 504.
Thus, the nature of the disabilities of plaintiffs in courtroom access
cases, combined with the definite applicability of Title II to courtrooms,
gives these cases an opportunity for success unmatched by other ADA
cases.
2. The DOJ Implementation of Title II of the ADA
The DOJ regulations implementing Title II (the "Title II
Regulations") provide additional support for an individual attempting to
secure his or her rights in an "access to the courts" case. The Title II
Regulations contain provisions that connect the protections of Title II to
state and local courthouses40 and grant specific auxiliary aids and
services to individuals with speech, hearing, and vision disabilities who
appear in court.
4 1
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
38. See supra note 15.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.
40. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.102, .104.
41. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2003). Further, public entities, including courts were
required by the Title II Regulations to perform, within one year of the ADA's effective date a
self-assessment of their "current services, policies, and practices" and to "proceed to make the
2003] 339
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The Title II Regulations' Preamble discusses what constitutes
access to the courts. For instance, the Preamble shows Congress' intent
that public buildings have elevators by using a courthouse as an
example. 42 The Preamble also discusses computer-assisted transcripts in
courtrooms as auxiliary aids.43
The applicability of Title II to state and local courts is discussed
explicitly. The Title II Regulations state that Title II is not limited to the
executive branch of state government, but rather, that it applies to the
legislative branch and to 'judicial branches of State and local
governments" as well.44  Furthermore, the prohibition against
discrimination applies to "all services, programs, and activities" of state
and local governments.4 5 This language clearly demonstrates that that
state and local courthouses are subject to the provisions of Title II.
The Title II Regulations also provide prerequisites for how
individuals with disabilities must be treated by state and local courts.
The Title II Regulations contain the boilerplate language that "No
qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any public entity."4 6 The regulations contain specific
language ensuring effective communication between individuals with
vision, hearing, and speaking disabilities, and state and local government
personnel.47 The Title II Regulations explicitly prohibit charging a
necessary modifications." 28 C.F.R. 35.105(a)..
42. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2003) A Vermont state court specifically held that the
"Americans with Disabilities Act mandates that all state and federal courts are prohibited from
discriminating based on disability." Vermont v. Bruyette, No. 984-9-96FrCr (D. Vt. Feb. 12,
1998) (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding Provision of Sign Language
Interpreters for Witness A.C. at Depostition and Trial) (on file with author). The court ordered a
defendant to provide a sign language interpreter for all questions and answers during a deaf
victim's deposition and trial testimony. Id.
47. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2003). The regulation states:
(a) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications
with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are
as effective as communications with others.
(b)(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services
where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity
to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity
conducted by a public entity.
(2) In determining what type of auxiliary aids and service is necessary, a
public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the
individual with disabilities.
340 [VOL. 3:333
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person with a disability for the cost of interpreters and other auxiliary
aids and services.48 In its Analysis accompanying the Title II
Regulations, the DOJ stated that interpreter costs could not be included as
court costs. The DOJ reasoned that:
The Department has already recognized that imposition of
the cost of courtroom interpreter services is impermissible
under section 504. The preamble to the Department's
section 504 regulation for its federally assisted programs
states that where a court system has an obligation to
provide qualified interpreters, 'it has the corresponding
responsibility to pay for the services for the interpreters.'.
Accordingly, recouping the costs of interpreter
services by assessing them as part of court costs would
also be prohibited. 49
The Title II Regulations contain some features that arguably limit the
responsibilities of state and local courts to ensure access. First, a public
entity is not required "to provide to individuals with disabilities personal
devices, such as wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as
prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; readers for personal use or study;
or services of a personal nature, including assistance in eating, toileting,
or dressing.,50 Apparently, this is the "flip side" of a public entity's
obligations to provide "reasonable modifications" and "auxiliary aids and
services." It would extend Title II beyond manageable bounds if state
and local courts were required to provide personal devices in all
instances. Hearing aids and glasses, for example, need to be specifically
designed for individuals. The "reasonable modification" or "auxiliary aid
and service" requirements mandate that state and local courts
Id.
48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f).
A public entity may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a
disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of
measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids or program accessibility,
that are required to provide that individual or group with the
nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.
Id.
49. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,705-06 (July 26,1991) (emphasis added) (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 37, 622,
37,630 (June 3, 1980)).
50. 28 C.F.R. § 35.135.
2003]
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accommodate the use of personal devices, but do not directly require that
public entities provide them. In other words, modifying steps by
providing a ramp is necessary, but not the wheelchair to get up the ramp.
Second, the language of the "existing facilities" provision of the
regulations may limit the responsibilities of state and local courts to
ensure access. 51 For example, under the "existing facilities" provision,
the Title II Regulations state that a public entity "shall operate each
service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity,
when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities." 52  A public entity is not necessarily
required to "make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities. 53 This would arguably require a state or
local court to make only one of its courtrooms accessible, not all of its
courtrooms, but the general accessibility requirements would still apply
to entrances, bathroom facilities, etc. A public entity is also not required
"to take any action that would threaten or destroy the historic
significance of an historic property., 54 Some state and local courts are
located in historic buildings, thereby giving governments a possible
defense for refusing to make structural changes.
Next, the "existing facilities" provision of the Title II Regulations
does not require a public entity to "take any action that it can demonstrate
would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service,
program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. 55
Finally, the "existing facilities" provision of the Title II Regulation offers
various means of compliance for existing facilities - "redesign of
equipment, reassignment of services to accessible buildings ... home
visits, delivery of services at alternative accessible sites, alteration of
51. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150.
52. Id.
53. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(1).
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(2).
55. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(3). The burden of proof rests with the public entity. Id. The
decision that compliance would cause a burden must be made by the head of a public entity or a
designee, and the reasons must be explained in a written statement. Id. Interestingly, the
"fundamental alteration" and "undue financial and administrative burden" language is not found
in the plain, statutory terms of Title II of the ADA. Nor does Title II of the ADA use the terms
"undue hardship" in either the definition of "discrimination" or the definition of "qualified
individual with a disability." By contrast, Title I of the ADA defines discrimination to include
"not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.., unless... the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the] covered entity." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Title I defines "undue hardship" to mean "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense" and lists "factors to be considered" in determining whether an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)-(B).
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existing facilities and construction of new facilities ...or any other
methods that result in making its services, programs, or activities readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities., 56 Therefore, an
individual with a disability does not always get to "select" the auxiliary
aid and service, or the reasonable modification of choice. Public entities
have some latitude in the means of making its program, activities, and
services accessible for individuals with disabilities. In other words, an
individual who wants access to a particular courthouse may be reassigned
to another courthouse that is accessible as a way of making judicial
services accessible.
On the other hand, the Title II Regulations give individuals with
disabilities input as to how they wish to be accommodated. For example,
the Title II Regulations state "in determining what type of auxiliary aid
and service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration
to the requests of the individual with disabilities." 57 Requiring that
public entities give primary consideration to the requests of individuals
with disabilities is another way of placing the burden on public entities to
demonstrate that a particular auxiliary aid or service would result in an
undue burden or a fundamental alteration. Individuals with disabilities
are far more knowledgeable about their own auxiliary aid and service
needs than public entities. If state and local courts want to provide an
auxiliary aid or service not requested by an individual with a disability,
they should shoulder the burden of proof that the auxiliary aid or service
is effective.
Even today, there are a number of state laws that directly
contradict the ADA by permitting the assessment of interpreter fees as
court costs-placing an impermissible surcharge on deaf litigants. 58 A
defendant found guilty in a criminal case, after being ordered to pay a
fine, should not also have to shoulder the costs of being able to
understand the proceedings against him/her. A potential plaintiff in a
civil case should not have to decide whether to bring suit based on the
56. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(3)(b).
57. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (2003). The regulation implementing Title II of the ADA also
requires public entities to provide TDDs or equally effective telecommunication systems when
the public entity communicates with applicants and beneficiaries by telephone. See, e.g., 28
C.F.R. §§ 35.161, .163 (2003).
58. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIv. P. 43(f) ("The court may appoint an interpreter.., and may fix
the interpreter's reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided
by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as
costs, in the discretion of the court."); AiK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-104(2) (Michie 2003) ("If an
interpreter is appointed by the court, the fee for the services of the interpreter shall be set by the
court and shall be paid in such manner as the court may determine, except that an acquitted
defendant shall not be required to pay any fee for the services of a court-appointed interpreter").
2003]
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costs in communicating with a judge, but rather solely on the merits of a
particular case. These blatantly discriminatory state laws are a
particularly egregious example of the need for civil rights enforcement
under Title 11
59
3. Early Judicial Application of the ADA to State Courthouses
Kroll v. St. Charles County 60 was one of the first federal cases to
conclude that a local courthouse would "be in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, when the Act becomes effective." 61 The court in
Kroll found that "[n]o sign language interpreters are employed or
available at the courthouse to assist individuals with hearing impairments
who were a party in a case, witness at a trial, juror, attorney, or individual
seeking information from one of the court personnel. 62 The court also
noted other barriers to people with disabilities, including, for example,
the lack of electronic doors and the lack of space in certain areas to
accommodate wheelchair users.
63
In Kroll, the county signed a consent order to correct accessibility
issues, but a proposed tax increase to fund the project was rejected.64
When the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt, the federal district court
noted that the county courthouse would be in violation of the ADA,
which would become effective the following year, and agreed to consider
59. The U.S. Department of Justice has settled numerous Title II ADA complaints dealing
with court access. See, e.g., Final Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America
and Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee,
http://www.ada.gov/nashvil2.htm (last revised Sept. 9, 2003) (last visited Dec. 22, 2003) (on file
with Margins: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class); Settlement
Agreement Between the United States of America and Hancock County, Miss. (Feb. 11, 1997),
http://www.ada.gov/hancocks.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2003) (on file with Margins: Maryland's
Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
60. 766 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mo. 1991).
61. Id. at 753 (Conclusion of Law 10). However, an even earlier case dealing with physical
access to a courthouse exists. See Hill v. Shelby County, 599 F. Supp. 303 (D. Ala. 1984). In
Hill, a sixty-eight year old woman with a lung condition that prevented her from climbing stairs
was a defendant in a civil suit in Shelby County, Alabama. Id. at 304. The courthouse, built in
1905, was on the second floor and there were no elevators. Id. The woman sued the county
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of a property interest without due process of law
and denial of equal protection. Id. The woman claimed that her property interest was created by
a provision of the state constitution and a state law ensuring full use of public facilities for
individuals with disabilities. Id. The federal district court held that the woman was not deprived
of due process or a property interest because county officials offered "to cooperate to make sure
that [her] defense ... [could] be fairly presented" so that she could participate in the proceeding
without climbing stairs. Id.
62. Kroll, 766 F. Supp. at 747 (Findings of Fact, St. Charles County Courthouse, D. 40).
63. Id. at 746 (Findings of Fact, St. Charles County Courthouse, B. 22, C. 28).
64. Id. at 751-52 (Findings of Fact, The Administration Building, D. 123-26).
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a property tax imposition if the county refused to fund the renovations. 65
The Kroll case offered early support to plaintiffs by highlighting the
explicit link between courtroom access and the ADA.66
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 was the first civil rights law ensuring the legal rights
of individuals with disabilities, but, unlike Title II, the statute applies
only to recipients of federal financial assistance. As initially enacted,
there was some legal authority for the now absurd proposition that if, for
example, a state or local court received federal funds for improving jury
service, but not child support, then the former, but not the latter, would
67be subject to section 504. This proposition has been overruled by
68
statute, and today all operations of state and local courts are covered
under section 504, which provides comparable protections to Title 11.69
1. The Statutory Language of Section 504
Section 504 provides: "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability ... shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 70 Section 504 does not define the term "otherwise qualified
individual with a disability", 71 and does not use the terms "reasonable
65. Id. at 753.
66. See also Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D. Ark. 1998). Mr. Matthews, who
has paraplegia, had three hearings in a county court house and had to be carried up and down the
stairs to get to a second floor courtroom. Id. at 528. He developed a urinary tract infection due to
inaccessible restrooms. Id. The court granted summary judgment for Mr. Matthews under Title
II of the ADA and 504, holding that the county failed to make its court facilities readily
accessible to and usable to individuals with mobility impairments. Id. at 534.
67. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
68. 29 U.S.C. §794(b) (2000).
69. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 636 (1984).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). Section 504 is a civil rights statute that prevents
discrimination against "all handicapped individuals.., in employment, housing, transportation,
education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs." Greater Los Angeles Council
on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The thrust of this mandate is "built around fundamental notions of equal access to state programs
and facilities." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1017 (1984). Congress "made a commitment to
the handicapped, that, to the maximum extent possible they shall be fully integrated into the
mainstream of life in America." Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 1983)
(quoting S. REP. No. 95-890, at 39 (1978)). The mainstream of American life includes state and
county courthouses and judicial proceedings that occur within those settings. See DeLong v.
Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (D. Pa. 1989); Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (D.
Mo. 1991).
71. The term "qualified handicapped person" is defined in the regulations implementing
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72modifications" or "auxiliary aids and service" in the text of the statute.
For purposes of section 504, it should not matter whether a particular
courthouse or program in question receives federal financial assistance,
so long as the court system itself receives this funding. The Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 198773 amended various civil rights statutes, including
section 504, by defining the term "program or activity" to mean "all of
the operations of... a department, agency.., or other instrumentality of
a State or of a local government., 74  In other words, "all of the
operations" of the state and local courts are subject to section 504
scrutiny, from parking to courthouse entry, to entering and exiting the
courtroom, and including the administrative, as opposed to the judicial,
decisions of a judge.75
2. The DOJ Regulations Implementing Section 504
The DOJ Regulations implementing section 504 (the "section 504
Regulations") contain a "general" prohibition on discrimination similar to
the Title II Regulations. 76 Furthermore, the section 504 Regulations are
entitled to substantial deference.77 The regulations generally provide that
"no qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity's
§504 to mean: "(a) With respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question and (b) With respect to
services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
such services." 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (2003).
72. The definition of an individual with a disability under the ADA is the same for §504.
See 29 U.S.C. §705(9) (2000); 42 U.S.C. 12102(2) (2000).
73. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Civil Rights Restoration Act
legislatively overturned the United States Supreme Court decision in Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984), and Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), dealing with program
specificity. The receipt of federal funding obligates the recipient to ensure all of its operations
comply with section 504, and not just those specific programs that benefited from the federal
financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2000).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(a). Moreover, in Galloway v. Superior Court, the federal district
court held that "[1]t is readily apparent that the Superior Court jury system falls within the
purview of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." 816 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993). The court
cited the definition of "program," 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A), noting that the Superior Court
received federal financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice. Id.
75. See, e.g., Avraham v. Zaffarano, 1991 WL 147541 (D. Pa. July 25, 1991).
76. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 42. In a 1981 letter, the Department of Justice advised the
administrator of the Alaska court system that its administrative rule that deaf litigants pay the cost
for sign language interpreter services in civil cases violated section 504 and the section 504
regulations. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Ass't Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Arthur T. Snowden, Administrative Director, Alaska Court System, at 2
(Mar. 6, 1981) (on file with author). The DOJ noted that the Alaska court system's failure to
provide any auxiliary aids-interpreters or telephonic devices-may have precluded effective
participation by deaf and hard of hearing persons in conducting business in the court system. Id.
77. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 635 and nn. 14-16 (1984).
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facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities,
be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity." 78 The regulations
also provide that:
A recipient that employs fifteen or more persons shall
provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified
handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or
speaking skills where a refusal to make such provisions
would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation
of such persons in a program receiving Federal financial
assistance. Such auxiliary aids may include may include
brailled and taped material, qualified interpreters, readers,
and telephonic devices.79
Like Title II, the non-discrimination requirements of section 504 mean
more than "you are free to enter." If a party with impaired sensory,
manual, or speaking skills can not understand the judge, the court
system-not the party-must take the steps necessary to ensure effective
participation.
The Analysis of the section 504 regulations is especially
applicable, as it mandates "full accessibility" in state and local courts for
"judges, jurors, plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, or... spectators." 80 The
plain language of section 504 is just as complete as that of Title II. There
are no definitions of "qualified individual with a disability", "auxiliary
aid or service", or "reasonable modifications" in the text of section 504.
Yet, the statutory language of section 504, combined with the detailed
regulatory provisions and analysis, provide effective tools for individuals
with disabilities to ensure "court access."
3. Early Judicial Interpretation ofsection 504: Access Expanded
While the first United States Supreme Court decision to consider
the meaning of section 504 took a rather limited view, other early United
States Supreme Court decisions recognized the importance of section 504
78. 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2003).
79. 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f) (2003) (emphasis added).
80. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620,37,627-33 (June 3, 1980) (Appendix B) (Analysis of Final Rule).
The Analysis of the rule also addresses the provision of services, emphasizing that individuals
with disabilities must receive court-provided services (e.g., appointed counsel) on an equal basis
with non-disabled individuals. Id. The Analysis even explain when auxiliary aids and services
would not be required, such as when a participant in a judicial proceeding continues to need a
service outside the context of the proceeding. Id. at 37,630-31.
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in vindicating the legal rights of individuals with disabilities. The Court
first analyzed section 504 in 1979 when it decided Southeastern
Community College v. Davis.81 The Court held that, section 504 did not
require a community college to make fundamental alterations to its
registered nurse training program in order to accommodate an applicant
with severe hearing loss.8 2 The Court also held that the applicant failed
to meet the legitimate and necessary physical requirements of the nursing
program as established by the community college. Finally, the Court
held that there was no section 504 violation when the college concluded
that the applicant was unqualified.83 Referencing 45 C.F.R. §84.3(k)(3),
the applicable section 504 regulation, the Court defined a qualified
handicapped individual as "a handicapped person who meets the
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation
in the [school's] education program or activity."8 4
Under Davis, the seminal case in all of civil rights jurisprudence
as it relates to individuals with disabilities, the groundwork was laid for
successful litigation in "access to the court" cases. Unlike postsecondary
education, where colleges and universities have leeway in establishing
their legitimate admission standards, the "fundamental alteration"
defense has not worked when the due process rights of court access are at
stake. 85 The definition of "qualified individual with a disability" is a key
factor in any postsecondary education or employment case, but, again,
the standard for who is qualified in a court access case is far less
strenuous.86 In other words, a criminal defendant is always "qualified"
for purposes of section 504, as is a party in a civil case.
In the next section 504 case, 87 the United States Supreme Court
held that:
[A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be
provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the
grantee offers. The benefit itself, of course, cannot be
defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access
to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access,
81. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
82. Id. at 409-10.
83. Id. at 406-7, 414.
84. Id. at 406.
85. See, e.g., Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
2622 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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reasonable accommodations in the grantee's programs or
benefits will have to be made.88
Here, the Court introduced a key phrase not found in the text of
the statute: "meaningful access." Access must be real, and not merely a
written policy with no "teeth." Again, the overly simplistic notion that
the "Courthouse is Open To All" will not survive scrutiny if there is no
ramp to get into the building, because the "benefit"-access to the
court-can not be defined so as to exclude individuals with mobility
impairments.
C. Statutory Protection in Federal Courthouses
Ironically, litigants with disabilities in federal courts have fewer
court access rights than litigants in state and local courts. This is because
the ADA and section 504 are federal laws that do not apply to the federal
court system.89 Unlike state and local entities, federal judicial agencies,
i.e. the federal courts, do not fall within the purview of the ADA. Section
504 is also inapplicable to the federal judiciary, as this statute applies
only to federally assisted programs, and federally conducted programs of
executive agencies of the federal government. 90 Since the federal
judiciary, a separate branch of government, is not an executive agency,
section 504 is inapplicable to the federal courts.
While the ADA and section 504 cannot be enforced against
federal courts, other federal laws and policies provide some court access
rights in federal courts. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968,91
mandates removal of architectural and communication barriers in
buildings and facilities that are constructed or altered with federal
funds. 92 In addition, the Court Interpreters Act93 governs access to
federal courts for deaf, hard-of-hearing, and speech impaired
individuals. 94  The Court Interpreters Act is limited to "judicial
proceedings instituted by the United States, "i.e. criminal, civil, pre-trial,
and grand jury proceedings. 95 If a deaf or speech-impaired person is a
88. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
89. Both acts refer to state and local government, and neither refers to federal courts. See
29 U.S.C. § 794(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(1).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), (b) (2000).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 4151-4157 (2000).
92. Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2000).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(b)(1) (2000).
95. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1828 (providing for special interpretation services in
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plaintiff in a suit, The Court Interpreters Act does not require the federal
court to provide an interpreter. For this reason, the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts addressed this shortcoming in a 1996
memorandum to all Chief Judges of the United States Courts entitled
"Services to Persons with Communication Disabilities." The guide to the
federal judiciary states in pertinent part:
1. General Policy
As adopted in September 1995, it is the policy of the
Judicial Conference that all federal courts provide
reasonable accommodations to persons with
communication disabilities.
2. Sign Language Interpreters and Other Auxiliary Aids
and Services
Each federal court is required to provide, at judiciary
expense, sign language interpreters or other appropriate
auxiliary aids and services to participants in federal court
proceedings who are deaf, hearing-impaired, or have
other communication disabilities. The court shall give
primary consideration to a participant's choice of
auxiliary aid or service.
"Auxiliary aids and services" include qualified
interpreters, assistive listening devices or systems, or
other effective methods of making aurally delivered
materials available to individuals with hearing
impairments. . . ."Participants" in court proceedings
include parties, attorneys, and witnesses. . . ."Court
Proceedings" include trials, hearings, ceremonies and
other public programs or activities conducted by a court.
"Primary consideration" means that the court is to honor a
participant's choice of auxiliary aid or service, unless it
can show that another equally effective means of
communication is available, or that the use of the means
chosen would result in a fundamental alteration in the
"multidefendant criminal actions and multidefendant civil actions" instituted by the United
States).
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nature of the court proceeding or in undue financial or
administrative burden.
96
Notably, the right to access, as stated by this memorandum policy,
is not absolute. The policy tracks the language of Title II and the Title II
Regulations by requiring that primary consideration be given to an
individual's preference. 97 The same "undue financial and administrative
burdens" and "fundamental alteration" defenses under the Title II
Regulations 98 are also covered in this policy. Further, while the policy
includes jurors in its definition of "participants," it intentionally omits
spectators. The policy permits the federal courts to ensure effective
communication for spectators in situations where they determine it to be
appropriate, for example, "providing an interpreter to the deaf spouse of a
criminal defendant so that the spouse may follow the course of the
trial." 99 The parallels between state and local courts and federal courts
provide an interesting paradox for individuals with disabilities dealing
with court access issues. Plaintiffs routinely ask federal judges to declare
that state and local judiciaries are not accessible at a time when, the
federal courts themselves, at least in theory, have limited access rights.
III. ACCESS TO THE COURTS AS A FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT
The combined use of Title II, section 504 and constitutional
principles to establish a fundamental due process right in "access to the
courts" cases makes a powerful argument that state and local courthouses
need to be architecturally and structurally accessible, and that court
personnel must establish effective means to communicate with
individuals who are deaf,100 or blind. 10' The Due Process Clause
0 2
96. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES, GUIDELINES FOR
PROVIDING SERVICES TO THE HEARING IMPAIRED AND OTHER PERSONS WITH COMMUNICATION
DISABILITIES Chapter 3, Part H (on file with author).
97. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (2003).
98. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2003).
99. See supra note 96.
100. See, e.g., Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of
summary judgment to defendant, allowing hearing impaired plaintiff to proceed with a claim
under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, § 1983, and a state statute); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260
F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendants, allowing hearing
impaired litigant to proceed with discrimination claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, §
1983, and a state statute).
101. See, e.g., Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993) (granting blind
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
20031
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provides the basic constitutional underpinning for the requirements of
both Title II and section 504 that state and local courts need to be fully
accessible in order to allow individuals with disabilities to participate in
and benefit from court programs. Courts would be hard-pressed to make
the argument that providing reasonable modifications and/or auxiliary
aids and services would somehow amount to a fundamental alteration or
an undue burden in light of the Due Process Clause, which guarantees
liberty to all. The significant liberty and property interests at stake for
parties in a court case make access imperative as both a constitutional
and statutory right. These constitutional implications are seen in two
cases, 0 3 one of which is presently pending before United States Supreme
Court. 104
A. Access to the Courts -Effective Communication
For some, access to the courts means being able to understand and
be understood when communicating in a courtroom. In Popovich v.
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,10 5 Mr. Popovich, an
individual with a hearing disability, brought an action in federal court
under Title II against a state court for allegedly failing to provide him
with adequate hearing assistance in a child custody case. 10 6  The
complaint claimed that the state court violated 42 U.S.C. § 1220307 by
excluding Mr. Popovich from participation in the custody case because of
his disability.'0 8 Mr. Popovich also alleged that court discriminated
against him by denying him "an equal opportunity . . . to enjoy the
benefits of a service conducted by the public entity [the state court]," and
"the opportunity to participate equally in the proceeding pending before
the court."' 0 9 In addition, he alleged that the state domestic relations
court retaliated against him for requesting hearing assistance and filing an
administrative complaint against the court with the Department of
Justice. 110 Mr. Popovich obtained a jury verdict in an Ohio federal court
against the state court for "$400,000 in compensatory damages based on
103. Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002);
Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003).
104. Lane v. Tennessee, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003).
105. 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 811.
107. This section, outside of Title II of the ADA, prohibits retaliation and coercion. See 42
U.S.C. §12203(a), (b).
108. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 816.
109. Id. ( quoting Tr. at 770, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, (D.
Ohio 1998) (No. 98-4100)).
110. Id.at8ll.
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an equal protection.. .claim of discrimination, a due process.. .claim of
unreasonable exclusion from participation in the custody proceeding, and
a claim of retaliation for filing an administrative complaint for failing to
accommodate his disability.""'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set aside
the verdict and remanded the case for a new trial under Title 11.112 The
court held that Mr. Popovich's claim was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment' 13 insofar as it relied on congressional enforcement of the
Equal Protection Clause, 1 4 but that the claim was not barred for relying
on congressional enforcement of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 1 5 because Title II was "appropriate" legislation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1'1 The court noted that
Mr. Popovich claimed that he had been denied "a reasonable way to
participate meaningfully in the proceeding.'17  In sum, the court
dismissed Mr. Popovich's Title II claim based on equal protection
principles and remanded his ADA claim based on due process principles
for consideration. The court recognized that Mr. Popovich had
significant due process interests in a child custody proceeding. The
court bundled two Title II bedrock principles - a public entity's failure to
accommodate a hearing disability and meaningful participation - and
addressed them in the context of a fundamental right - access to the
court. The court recognized the stark reality of Mr. Popovich's plight,
both from a constitutional and statutory perspective:
If he cannot understand what is happening during the
custody hearing, it will be impossible for him to refute
clams made against him, or to offer evidence on his own
behalf. Consequently, a state's failure to accommodate
plaintiff's deafness may greatly increase the risk of error
in the proceeding, precluding one side from responding to
111. Id..
112. Id.
113. The Eleventh Amendment states that "the Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity ... against one of the United States." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
114. "No State shall.., deny to any person.. .the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
115. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815-16. "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
117. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 813.
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charges made by the opposing party, an essential element
in our adversary system.
1 i8
The court implicitly recognized that no Title II fundamental
alteration or undue burden was at stake here from the Ohio state court's
perspective. The "paramount governmental interest" for Ohio was "to
insure that the State's most vulnerable citizens are placed with the parent
best suited for providing for their welfare."' 119 This interest could only be
achieved if Mr. Popovich was able "to understand and to respond to the
arguments," so that the judge could make a reasoned decision about Mr.
Popovich's ability to care for his child.
120
The court also applied Title II principles in recognizing that Ohio
had "an obvious need to administer its decisions in a cost-conscious and
time-effective manner."' 21 Even in court-access cases under Title II, a
requested accommodation "may become so expensive or onerous as to
outweigh their usefulness in reaching a decision." 122 However, in light of
the Due Process Clause, the bar is set very high in Title II cases as to
what would constitute a fundamental alteration or an undue burden. That
is, it would be difficult in a courtroom access case for a state or local
court to argue that providing reasonable modifications for individuals
with disabilities is not required because of the burden that the
modification would place on the court. 123 The court also recognized that,
in most instances, the costs for "supplying the requested accommodations
are fairly low.' 124 This is so because Title II permits a trial to be moved
from an inaccessible courthouse to another building that is accessible. 125
Finally, the court balanced the minimal harm to state and local courts that
provided reasonable modification and auxiliary aids and services with the
real harm to parties with disabilities who "may be virtually 'excluded
from participation in' the state proceeding unless adjustments are made to
accommodate the party's disability"'1 6 and found for Mr. Popovich.127
Mr. Popovich's case presents a compelling factual example that
raises due process concerns. A father sought to force the state to provide
118. Id. at 815.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 815.
125. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b) (2003).
126. Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815.
127. Id. at 816.
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him with hearing assistance for a state judicial proceeding to determine
his custody rights. The "reasonable modifications" and "auxiliary aids
and services" provisions are meant only to affect the means in which the
case is tried-and not to give an "advantage" to a party with a disability.
After all, no litigant with a hearing impairment wins his/her case by
having the court provide interpreter services or assistive listening devices
- only the fair and equal opportunity to prevail. As the court in
Popovich aptly concluded: "the 'participation' requirement of Title II
serves to protect Popovich's due process right to a meaningful
hearing."' 28 In civil cases involving parties with disabilities, this is all
that Title II requires, but it is a significant requirement.' 29
B. Access to the Courts - Mobility
More recently, the issue of citizens with disabilities "seeking to
vindicate their right of access to the courts in Tennessee"' 30 was analyzed
in Lane v. Tennessee.13 1 In affirming a denial of the state's motion to
dismiss and remanding for trial, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit reiterated that "among the rights protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the right of access to the
courts."' 
3 2
128. Id. at 815.
129. See also Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a class of
prisoners with disabilities were denied meaningful opportunity to participate in parole hearings),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 812 (2002).
130. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 123 S. Ct.
2622 (2003). The United States Supreme Court decision in Lane will have profound implications
for Title 1I of the ADA and the rights of individuals with disabilities in general. The issue for
review in Lane is whether Congress validly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to
enable private individuals to bring damages suits to protect the exercise of fundamental
constitutional rights by individuals with disabilities and to ensure to these individuals the equal
protection of the law under Title II of the ADA. Yet, aside from the core constitutional principles
to be decided in Lane, the fact remains that Lane deals with but one Title II ADA remedy,
monetary damages. Whatever the outcome, state and local courts after Lane will be hard pressed
to defend Title II ADA lawsuits alleging that courthouses and courtrooms are not accessible,
because the state and local governments in defending the claims for monetary damages will
undoubtedly have the burden of proof that they have achieved accessibility.
131. 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003).
132. Id. Lane alleged that he was "denied the benefit of access to the courts," while Jones, a
co-plaintiff, claimed that she suffered exclusion resulting from "an inability to access the physical
facilities." Id. at 683. The specific factual details of their claims, however, remain unclear
because no factual record was developed when the district court rendered its decision. Id. Mr.
Lane "could not appear at his own trial without having to crawl up two flights of steps, and was
arrested when he refused to crawl further or be carried. Eventually the problem was 'solved' by
having Mr. Lane's lawyer run back and forth between his client and the second floor courtroom,
denying Mr. Lane the ability to be present at proceedings critical to his case." Brief of The
MARGINS
In Lane, the court applied Title II in the context of a criminal
case. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, the court
recognized that for criminal defendants "the Due Process Clause has been
interpreted to provide that 'an accused has a right to be present at all
stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the
proceedings."" 33 The court saw no need to distinguish between criminal
and civil cases in so far as the parties in both instances had a "due
process right to be present in the courtroom and to meaningfully
participate in the process unless their exclusion furthers important
governmental interests."' 34 The tie between the constitutional rights and
the statutory rights of individuals with disabilities is clear. The United
States Supreme Court purposely uses the terms "meaningful[] access"
and "meaningfully participate" interchangeably in analyzing both due
process rights and rights under Title II and section 504.13' The Sixth
Circuit endorsed the connection of constitutional rights and civil rights in
court access cases: "Based on the record before Congress in considering
the Americans with Disabilities legislation, it was reasonable for
Congress to conclude that it needed to enact legislation to prevent states
from unduly burdening constitutional rights, including the right of access
to the courts."'1 3 6 In Lane, the court recognized the leeway given to states
to ensure that constitutional rights are protected. 137 The flexibility in
Title II enhances and enforces the due process precepts upon which the
federal statute is based. State and local courts can meet their
constitutional and statutory obligation by taking the "major step of
renovating facilities to the relatively minor step of assigning aides to
assist in access to the facilities."
' 38
Finally, Lane discounted some of the "reasons" for a public
entity's failure to make its courthouses accessible. "The record
demonstrated that public entities' failure to accommodate the needs of
qualified persons with disabilities may result directly from
unconstitutional animus and impermissible stereotypes."' 39 The court
found neither of these to be permissible defenses. Only Title II's bedrock
Honorable Dick Thornburgh and The National Organization on Disability, The American
Association of People With Disabilities, and ADA Watch as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, 2003 WL 22733908, *8 (Nov. 11, 2003).
133. Id. at 682 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15 (1975)).
134. Id. (citing Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 813-
14 (6th Cir. 2002); Helminski v. Ayerst Labs., 766 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1985).
135. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
136. Lane, 315 F.3d at 682-83.
137. Id. at 683.
138. Id. at 683.
139. Id.
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defenses-unreasonable costs or an inability to accommodate-fit within
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and congressional intent.1 40
The United States Supreme Court's constitutional precedents, as
applied in Popovich and Lane, combined with the statutory and
regulatory language of Title II and section 504, provide the necessary
"one-two punch" in ensuring that individuals with disabilities are
provided with meaningful access to the courts. These constitutional and
statutory predicates form the basis for the many successful claims against
state and local courts.
IV. PROTECTION OF ACCESS TO STATE AND LOCAL COURTHOUSES
UNDER THE ADA AND SECTION 504
There have been several court decisions in which state and local
governments were held in violation of the ADA and section 504 because
courthouses were inaccessible to people with disabilities. These cases
have created strong precedent in favor of disabled plaintiffs where court
access is at issue, paving the way for victories to come. The cases below
stand for the following propositions: (1) in the context of "access to the
courts," advocates have not been faced with the dilemma of the
"disability defined" issue because plaintiffs barred from the courthouses
are individuals who are deaf, blind, or have mobility impairments 141 and
(2) the defenses of fundamental alteration and undue burden, available to
all public entities, including state and local courts, are not as effective as
in other ADA cases such as, employment cases. When an employer
successfully argues that an accommodation costs too much, the employer
demonstrates harm to the business. However, courts are designed to
adjudicate disputes, and it is difficult to imagine judges suffering harm
for simply assuring that their courtroom is accessible. In fact, judges
who preside in a courtroom that is not accessible run the real risk of
having to defend their discriminatory actions in a Title II and section 504
case.
140. Id. at 681.
141. See discussion infra, Part IV.A.
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A. Access to State Courts for Deaf and Hard of Hearing Individuals
In addition to Popovich, other deaf and hard of hearing
individuals have had great success in litigating court access cases. In
Duvall v. County ofKitsap, 142 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of a hearing-impaired person who was denied
videotext transcription services. The plaintiff, Mr. Duvall, was a party to
a divorce proceeding. 43 He argued that he could not meaningfully
participate in the proceeding without the accommodation of videotext.144
Videotext, or real-time captioning, is the spoken word typed by a court
reporter or other professional captioner that is displayed on a screen to be
read by an individual with a hearing disability.145 Although government
officials had offered an assistive listening device and the option of sitting
anywhere in the courtroom, the court found that the government did not
reasonably accommodate Mr. Duvall. 146 The court noted that there is a
governmental duty "to investigate whether a requested accommodation is
reasonable"' 147  because "'mere speculation that a suggested
accommodation is not feasible falls short of the reasonable
accommodation requirement [of the ADA]."" 48  Therefore, Duvall
represented a double victory in terms of access to the court. First, an
individual with a disability was recognized as deserving the ability to
meaningfully participate in judicial proceedings. Second, access must
now be provided in a way that meets every disabled individual's needs,
and not simply the needs of the courts and government administrators.
In Chisolm v. McManimon,149 the plaintiff, Mr. Ronald Chisolm,
a deaf man, was arrested in Mercer County, N.J. for allegedly failing to
attend driving classes that were required as a result of a 1987 conviction
for driving while under the influence, on an arrest warrant issued by a
judge in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.' 50 After being incarcerated for
five days in a county detention center, Mr. Chisolm was taken to the
142. 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
143. Id. at 1129.
144. Id.
145. Id. at n.1.
146. Id. at 1140. Whether a specific auxiliary aid or service is appropriate depends on the
particular needs of an individual with a disability. For example, an assistive listening device that
works to enhance sound may not be sufficient given the level of an individual's hearing loss.
Instead, for some deaf individuals, whose primary means of communication is in written English,
the ability to read text is necessary auxiliary aid and service.
147. Seeid. at 1136.
148. Id. (quoting Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999)).
149. 275 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2001).
150. Id. at 318.
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Mercer County Court, where he remained for fifteen minutes until the
judge realized that Mr. Chisolm was deaf and that an interpreter was
required to ensure effective communication. 151 Mr. Chisolm returned to
the detention center where a friend told him that he would remain
incarcerated for an additional week, at which time an interpreter would
become available. However, no hearing occurred and the matter was
adjourned. 152 Following his counsel's intervention, Mr. Chisolm was
released from the detention center. 153 He then sued both the detention
center and the court for violations of Title II and section 504.154 Mr.
Chisolm alleged that he was discriminated against because the court
failed to make attempts to obtain "a certified interpreter immediately,
instead scheduling the next hearing for six days after the first
hearing... thereby forcing plaintiff to remain incarcerated if plaintiff's
attorney had not intervened."'1 55
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
concluded that Mr. Chisolm's claims against the court system failed
because he was never excluded from a program-the extradition hearing-
because of his disability. 156 The court granted summary judgment for the
court defendant on grounds that a hearing had not occurred, the matter
was adjourned for lack of an interpreter, Mr. Chisolm was released, and
that he never reappeared in court.
157
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding
that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the county's attempt to
use lip reading and note writing in lieu of an interpreter was
inadequate.158 Referencing the Title II Regulations, the court noted that
"a public entity must give preference to a disabled person's choice of
auxiliary aid.' ' 159 As in Duvall, there is the presumption that courts
should defer to an individual's preferred method of achieving "access" to
151. Chisolm v. Manimon, Civ. No. 95-0991, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24063, at *3 (D. N.J.
June 11, 1997).
152. Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 320.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 320-21.
155. Chisolm v. Manimon, Civ. No. 95-0991, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24063, at **3-4 (D.
N.J. June .11, 1997) (quoting Pl.'s Br. at 1-2).
156. See 97 F. Supp. 2d 615 (2000).
157. In a separate opinion, the district court granted summary judgment with respect to Mr.
Chisolm's claims against the detention center. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded this
claim. See Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 332.
158. Id. at 328.
159. Id. at 326 n.10.
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the courts. 160 The Chisolm court also stated that the effectiveness of
auxiliary aids is a factual issue, 16 1 indicating that disabled plaintiffs are
generally able to reach the jury in access to court cases.
In the case of Soto v. City of Newark, 162 access rights for disabled
individuals who were not parties to a case, but used a local courthouse for
their wedding ceremony, were at issue.' 63  The Sotos, two deaf
individuals who communicated primarily in American Sign Language,
decided to get married. 164 On three occasions, they asked the City of
Newark Municipal Court to accommodate their disability by providing a
sign language interpreter for their wedding ceremony. 165 The Municipal
Court rejected their requests. 166
In granting summary judgment to the Sotos under the ADA,
section 504, and state law, the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey wrote that "as a result of their disability, they did not fully
understand their vows or the words spoken by the presiding judge."'' 67
The court cited Congress' finding that "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ... access to public
services."' 68 The district court rejected the municipal court's argument
that a wedding was not a "service"' 69 under the ADA, stating that the
Title II Regulations mandate that the ADA's coverage extends to "all
services... made available by public entities," 170 i.e., "anything a public
entity does."' 17 1 After finding that the municipal court wedding was a
"service" under the ADA, the district court ruled that the Sotos were
denied the benefit of the "service" in a manner "equal to that afforded to
others" because they could not understand or effectively communicate
with each other or the judge during their wedding. 72 The district court
also found that providing interpreters for the municipal court wedding
was a "'reasonable accommodation' and would impose no "'undue
burden"' on the defendant. 7 3 In fact, the municipal court provided
160. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. See Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 327.
162. 72 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D.N.J. 1999).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 490-91 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
166. Id. (citation omitted)
167. Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 492 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4)).
169. Id. at 493-94.
170. Id. at 493 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (1999)).
171. Id. at 493-94 (quoting Yeskey v. Pa. Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir.
1997)) (alteration in the original) (citation omitted).
172. Id. at 494 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(ii) (1999)).
173. Id. at 496.
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interpreters for court cases involving hearing-impaired parties or
witnesses.174  The district court's reasoning in Soto re-enforces the
principle that merely requiring access for individuals who wish to
participate in judicial proceedings is not enough - the access must be
meaningful. 1
75
In sum, the above-referenced cases demonstrate principles
recognized by The United States Supreme Court over a decade ago in
Alexander v. Choate.' 76 These principles are now engrained in federal
law: state and local courts must provide qualified individuals with
disabilities "with meaningful access to benefits that a federal fund
grantee offers"' 177 and these courts are "required to make reasonable
modifications to accommodate the disabled."'
' 78
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland has
also addressed refusals by Maryland state courts to provide sign language
interpreters and assessment of interpreter fees as court costs. 179  In
174. Id. at n. 11. In another case, the State of New Jersey and the Administrative Director of
the Courts agreed to require municipal courts to post a sign with the hearing impaired logo in their
courtrooms and to "include reference to auxiliary aids and services as well as the hearing
impaired logo." Derosa v. Boro of South Plainfield, C.A. No. 99-2531 (JCL) (D. N.J. July 31,
2001) (Memorandum of Understanding Accomplishing Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, at
4). The Logo reads:
Notice to the Deaf & Hard of Hearing:
You have the right to a sign language interpreter or other
reasonable accommodation if one is required for you to effectively
communicate in Court. If you require a sign language interpreter
or other accommodation to communicate, please let us know.
Id. (Memorandum of Understanding Accomplishing Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice,
Exhibit C). The settlement with municipal defendants provided that each municipal court would
designate an" 'ADA Coordinator' to accept and process requests for auxiliary aids or services to
accommodate persons who are deaf or hard of hearing." Id. (Memorandum of Understanding, at
3). The municipal court ADA Coordinator would receive a loose leaf binder that contained
directives and materials of the Administrative Office of the Courts on the issue of access of deaf
and hard of hearing individuals to the courts. Id. (Memorandum of Understanding, at 4). The
settlement also called for appropriate training to municipal court judges and staff to ensure their
familiarity with and understanding of the requirements of federal and state law barring
discrimination on the basis of hearing disability; and signage. Id. The plaintiffs also reached a
separate settlement with eight municipal courts which agreed to pay $157,000 to the plaintiffs.
Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of the Deaf Law Center, Muncipal Courts Pay $157,000 in Landmark
Settlement with Deaf Citizens (Aug. 31, 2001) (on file with author).
175. See Soto v. City of Newark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489, 494 (D. N.J. 1999) ("Where a
governmental entity coordinates, schedules and conducts proceedings on its own premises to
benefit the public, such conduct is necessarily a 'service' to the public.").
176. See Kroll v. St. Charles County, 766 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mo. 1991).
177. Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191-92
(3d Cir. 1989).
178. Id. at 1192.
179. In Cutshaw v. Kratovil, the State of Maryland and two judges agreed "to provide and
pay for qualified sign language interpreter services for a deaf defendant at any stage of a criminal
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Herrold v. Duckett,18° Mr. Herrold sought declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief against Judge Warren B. Duckett, Jr. of the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County, the State of Maryland, and Anne Arundel
County. In this case, Judge Duckett signed an order appointing a sign
language interpreter at Mr. Herrold's expense.' 81 Mr. Herrold alleged
that the defendants' assessment of and refusal to pay for the interpreter
services violated Title II, section 504, and the U.S. Constitution. 82 Mr.
Herrold sought a declaratory judgment stating that Maryland Courts &
Judicial Proceedings section 9-114 ("section 9-114") violated federal law
insofar as it permitted a state court to allow interpreter fees to be assessed
as part of court costs. 183 Mr. Herrold also sought an injunction ordering
Judge Duckett to rescind his order and requiring the defendants to pay for
interpreter services.' 
84
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Maryland issued a memorandum dated
July 17, 1992 to state trial court judges.' 85 The memorandum admitted
proceeding in a State of Maryland District Court throughout the State." Civ. Action No. JFM-
3209 (D. Md. June 8, 1992) (Consent Decree, at 3 (Item 1)). The defendants also agreed to pay
$2,000 to a deaf individual who was initially denied interpreter services in a criminal hearing. Id.
at 4 (Item 10).
180. Civil Action No. B92-1698 (D. Md. 1992).
181. Anne Arundel County v. Herrold, No. 3115760 (Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, Oct. 30, 1991).
182. Herrold v. Duckett, Civ. Action No. JFM-3209 (D. Md. June 8, 1992) (Complaint, at 2).
183. Id.
184. Id. Similarly, in Indiana, a deaf individual filed a small claims action in a state court.
Clark v. Bridges, No. IP 93 877-C (D. Ind. Sept. 23, 1994) (Consent Decree, at 2). She asked a
county judge to appoint a qualified interpreter at no cost to her. Id. The judge refused, stating
that "'the court will hear evidence by way of written documents rather than verbal communication
or signing."' The deaf individual sued the State of Indiana and the county court judge in federal
court, claiming discrimination under the ADA and section 504. Id. The case settled when the
Indiana Supreme Court agreed to amend its trial rules in order to comply with the ADA. Id. at 4.
The county court agreed to provide an interpreter in the small claims court proceeding and further
agreed that the fee would not be assessed against the deaf individual, regardless of the outcome of
the case. Id. In Ohio, a deaf man was a defendant in a criminal proceeding in a county court.
Shafer v. Judkins, No. C-193-887 (D. Ohio Aug. 16, 1994) (Consent Decree, at 1). A county
judge ordered him to pay more than $200 in interpreter costs during his hearings. Id. at 2-3. The
deaf man filed a complaint in an Ohio federal court, claiming violations of the ADA and section
504. Id. at 2. In response to the lawsuit, the county judge entered an order relieving the deaf man
of the obligation to pay for interpreter fees. Id. at 3. The county court also adopted a new local
rule providing that "[a]ll parties and witnesses who appear before the court, who are deaf, shall be
afforded a properly certified and trained interpreter at County expense .... No Interpreter's fee
shall be taxe[d] as court costs against any deaf party or witness." Id.
185. Memorandum from Alexander Wright, Jr. and Alexander H. Baida, Ass't Attorney
Generals, Office of the Attorney General, Civil Litigation Division, Baltimore, MD to "All state
district and circuit court judges." (July 17, 1992) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law
Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class) [hereinafter Memorandum to Maryland Judges].
The memorandum was sent with the subject heading "The assessment of interpreter fees against
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that the Maryland law' 86 allowing "state courts in their discretion to tax
as part of the costs of a case amounts paid to sign language interpreters
assigned to deaf parties" was in conflict with the ADA.' 87 The
memorandum noted that the ADA prohibited the imposition of such fees
against deaf individuals because there was no such fee imposed on non-
disabled individuals. 188 The memorandum further stated that "[r]equiring
deaf parties to pay such fees also interferes with their right of access to
the courts."
'1 89
Unfortunately, the policy implicitly allows a court to assess a
hearing litigant for interpreter fees when a hearing litigant loses a case to
a deaf litigant. Also, the policy seemingly permits assessment of
interpreter fees against a hearing litigant if a deaf witness is called to
testify. Nevertheless, following the implementation of the policy, Mr.
Herrold was no longer required to reimbursement the state for the
interpreter costs.
Further, the Maryland General Assembly amended section 9-114
in an attempt to conform to Title II. Rather than eliminating the
provision that allows courts to assess interpreter fees as costs, the state
legislature simply added the words "in accordance with the provisions of
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act."'1 90 Instead, the General
Assembly should have rewritten the statute to prohibit the assessment of
interpreter costs and ensure that interpreters were provided by the state
and local court.
The access to the court cases involving individuals with hearing
disabilities are broadly applicable to all litigants with disabilities. While
the issue of who is disabled under Title II and section 504 needs to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis - parties, witnesses, judges, jurors, and
spectators are all qualified. 19' Factual issues exist as to what is a
reasonable modification or an appropriate auxiliary aid or service, but it
should be relatively easy to substitute the auxiliary aids and services
utilized by deaf and hard of hearing individuals (videotext, interpreter
services, and assistive listening devices), with a variety of auxiliary aids
and services utilized by other individuals with disabilities. The success
deaf parties." Id.
186. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-114(b) (2003).
187. Memorandum to Maryland Judges, supra note 205.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 1993 Md. Laws 600 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-114(b) (2003)).
191. See discussion supra Part IV.
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of individuals with hearing disabilities is the result of fitting the right
"accommodation" with the appropriate "need" of the specific person.
This is the linchpin of Title II - making an individualized assessment.
B. Physical Entry and Exit from the Courtroom
Individuals with mobility impairments have also successfully
challenged state courts that have denied them access because they are
physically unable to enter and exit a courtroom. In the 1995 case of
Livingston v. Guice, 192 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit decided that a judge was not immune from suit in the area of
disabled individuals' access to the court.193 Livingston involved a
wheelchair-bound individual with multiple sclerosis who wanted to
attend a trial in which her nephew was a criminal defendant. 194 After the
judge prohibited Ms. Livingston from entering and exiting the courtroom
through the door adjacent to his bench, the only handicap-accessible
door, Ms. Livingston sued the judge and the state of North Carolina
under Title 11.195 The district court never reached the merits of Ms.
Livingston's claims and dismissed the suit on immunity grounds.' 96
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that
immunity did not lie when a plaintiff sought injunctive relief.' 97 The
Fourth Circuit noted that absolute immunity applies only to civil damages
and "does not immunize judges from claims for equitable relief."' 98
Judges, who may often be the defendants in access to court cases, would
not completely escape liability under the holding in Livingston. As seen
in Livingston, there is a strong argument that ajudge cannot limit or deny
access to an individual with a disability.
Individuals with mobility impairments in Maryland have also had
great success in litigating "access to court" issues. In Reid v.
Glendening,199 the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue
of liability, finding that the State of Maryland was in violation of Title II
and section 504. In an unpublished decision, the court found that state
192. 68 F.3d 460 (4th Cir. 1995) (Table). The full decision is available on Westlaw.
Livingston v. Guice, No. CA-92-131-5-C-MU, 1995 WL 610355 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 1995).
193. Livingston, 1995 WL 610355, at *1.
194. Id. at*l.
195. Id. at * 1-2.
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. at *4.
198. Id. at*3.
199. Civ. No. AMD 96-2337 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 1998) (Order granting summary judgment).
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courthouse buildings contained "major barriers" that denied "ready and
meaningful access" to individuals with disabilities.20 0  Among these
barriers were an "undignified entrance," a "noncompliant entrance...
[with] insufficient maneuvering space," "noncompliant room
identification signs," "inaccessible toilet rooms," and "inaccessible jury
rooms and jury toilet rooms."20 1 Finally, the court stressed that "[t]here
are serious ramifications when the very institution designed to ensure the
delivery of equal justice under law to all individuals perpetuates such
discrimination." 20 2  Although unreported, Reid, provides necessary
support for advocates challenging courthouses and courtrooms that are
not accessible. 203
C. Juror Access
Jurors, like parties, can encounter barriers to courtroom access as
well.204 In Galloway v. Superior Court,20 5 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the D.C. Superior Court
violated section 504 by categorically excluding blind individuals from
jury service, stating :
Defendants' policy [of excluding blind individuals from
jury service] is based on the assumption that visual
observation is an essential function or attribute of a
juror's duties. In reaching this conclusion, however,
defendants failed to examine any studies or review any
200. Reid v. Glendening, Civ. No. AMD 96-2337 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 1998) (Memorandum
accompanying Order granting summary judgment, at 3).
201. Id. (quoting testimony of report of Mark Mazz, defense expert) (internal quotations
omitted).
202. Id. at 4.
203. Following summary judgment, the parties entered into a comprehensive remedial plan.
Reid v. Glendening, Civ. No. AMD 96-2337 (D. Md. Jan. 14,2000) (Order approving remedial
plan). The plan included renovations for entrances and hallways in the courthouse, installation of
a new microphone system with assisted listening devices, and architectural and carpentry
renovations in courtrooms and jury rooms throughout the courthouse. Id. at Attachment B. The
estimated cost of the renovations was $1 million. Id. at Attachment B.
204. See, e.g., DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (D. Pa. 1989) (holding that deaf
woman could not be barred from jury service); People v. Caldwell, 603 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1993)
(accommodating visually impaired juror by providing enlarged print versions of tape transcripts
and reading documents into the record). But see Eckstein v. Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Ark.
1978) (holding that deaf and vision impaired jurors were unfit to serve).
205. 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993).
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literature on the ability of blind individuals to serve on
juries or the ability of these individuals to assess
credibility.
20 6
The district court disapproved of the superior court's stereotypical
rationale for excluding blind jurors, but it did not impose aper se rule of
inclusion, reasoning that "the decision.., should be left to the Judge, the
attorneys, and the voir dire process" 20 7 Again, the court favored an
individualized approach in dealing with a "court access" issue by making
a specific assessment of the qualifications of a particular person in light
of the case to be presented at trial even when the plaintiff was not a party
to the suit.2 0 8 Constitutional rights are implicated whether one is denied
the right to serve on a jury or denied the right to participate in his or her
own case.
209
206. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
207. Id. at 18.
208. In a footnote, the court explained:
Whether a blind juror can serve competently can be addressed on a case-by-
case basis. During voir dire, jurors routinely inform the court of physical
ailments or disabilities, temporary or otherwise, which could impede their
ability to serve during that trial. In these instances, the judge determines, on
an individual basis after inquiry, whether that juror can serve on that
particular case. This routine process occurs every day in every court.
Members of the venire often advance a variety reasons which may impact
their ability to serve, including ... needing to take medication at regular
hours, taking medication which induces drowsiness, requiring frequent and
regular recesses, having dietary requirements which cannot be satisfied by
food available in the court cafeteria .... These needs and constraints are
addressed in the regular course of choosing ajury and may in some instances
result in a determination that a juror cannot be accepted because either the
flow of trial would be irreparably injured or a fair trial might not result. It is
no different if there is a blind person in the venire. That person can be
individually questioned to ascertain his or her abilities vis-a-vis that
particular trial.
Id. at 18.
209. Courts have also held that deaf individuals cannot be disqualified from jury service
solely because of their disability. See, e.g., DeLong v. Brumbaugh, 703 F. Supp. 399 (D. Pa.
1988); People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1990); United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084
(10th Cir. 1987). See also Harold Craig Mason, Jury Selection: the Courts, the Constitution, and
the Deaf, 11 PAC. L.J. 967 (1980), Michael B. Goldbas, Due Process, the Deaf and the Blind as
Jurors, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 135 (1981); Randy Lee, Equal Protection and a Deaf Person's
Right to Serve as a Juror, 17 N.Y.U. REv. & Soc. CHANGE 81 (1989-1990). But see Eckstein v.
Kirby, 452 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Ark. 1978) (upholding a state law disqualifying persons unable to
speak or understand English and persons with substantially impaired hearing or seeing as grant
jury or petit jurors); Commonwealth v. Susi, 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985) (reversing and
remanding a criminal conviction because the trial judge refused the defendant's challenge for
cause of a blind juror).
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D. Access Denied
Despite the successes of access to court cases nationally, the right
to access is limited in Maryland. 2  The Court of Appeals of Maryland
recently held that a trial court may exclude a disabled plaintiff from the
liability phase of a medical malpractice action under certain
circumstances. 211 The court affirmed the granting of defendant's motion
in limine to exclude the plaintiff, a severely brain-damaged adult who
"required continuing nursing care and extensive medical equipment," 212
from the courtroom. 213 The court apparently agreed with the trial court's
conclusion that the plaintiff was "'reduced to a vegetable state"' and
could serve "'no purpose"' in court but to prejudice the defendant. 214 In
an effort to rationalize its decision, the trial court suggested that the
plaintiff's inability to communicate rendered him valueless in aiding his
attorneys.21 5 This inability to communicate was allegedly caused by the
defendants' negligence, and thus was related to the case.216
Although Green was not an ADA case, an underlying ADA claim
arguably existed because access to the courtroom was denied.217 In
relying on Mr. Green's inability to communicate and his vegetative
condition, 218 the court practically admits that he was excluded from the
courtroom, in the words of the ADA, "by reason of such disability.
'
"
2 19
While seemingly limited to medical malpractice actions, the court's
decision in Green could be used to frame arguments favoring the
exclusion of individuals with disabilities from courtrooms in other
contexts as well.
210. See Green v. North Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 785 A.2d 361 (Md. 2001).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 370.
213. Id. at364.
214. Id. at 371 (quoting the trial court decision).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 364-65.
217. Id. at 364. The plaintiff based a portion of his appeal on the ADA, but the court failed
to resolve the issue. Id. at 371-72.
218. Id. at 371.
219. Id.; 42 U.S.C § 12132 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION
Two sitting United States Supreme Court Justices have spoken on
the issue of "access to the court," albeit under different circumstances
than as a civil right issue affecting millions of Americans with
disabilities. In Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., Justice Stevens stated in a
concurring opinion that:
Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished
value in our democratic society .... The courts provide
the mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes that
might otherwise give rise to attempts at self-help. There
is, and should be, the strongest presumption of open
access to all levels of the judicial system.... This Court,
above all, should uphold the principle of open access.
220
More recently, Justice Breyer stated: "Central both to the idea of
the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain
open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. 221
These words have special meaning in the context of "access to the
court" cases - a fundamental right of citizenship for all individuals. Mr.
Lane should not have been required to crawl up steps, even one time, or
risk being found in contempt. Mr. Popovich should not have had to
undergo a civil trial where child custody issues were at stake when he
could not fully hear - or fully comprehend-what the judge, lawyers,
and witnesses were saying. Mr. Galloway should not have been required
to file suit to challenge a "blanket" policy prohibiting all blind
individuals from serving as jurors. In Maryland, Mr. Reid and his fellow
plaintiffs should not have had to sue the State to be able to enter and exit
a courthouse or courtroom. Equally important, the defendants-state and
local governments-in the cases cited herein should have heeded the
words of Justices Stevens and Breyer. Instead of "fighting" to defend
their discriminatory policies, practices, and procedures, the state and
local governments should have worked to ensure the principles of "open
access." and "open on impartial terms." Equally important are the words
of Emeka Nwojke, the Assistant Director of the Northeast Independent
Living Program, during a Congressional hearing:
220. Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070-71 (1985).
221. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
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ACCESS TO THE COURTS
I went to the courtroom one day and .... I could not get
into the building because there were about 500 steps to
get in there. Then I called for the security guard to help
me, who .... told me there was an entrance at the back
door for the handicapped people.
.... I went to the back door and there were three
more stairs for me to get over to be able to ring a bell to
announce my arrival so that somebody would come and
open the door any maybe let me in .... This is the court
system that is supposed to give me a fair hearing. It took
me 2 hours to get in .... And when [the judge] finally
saw me in the courtroom, he could not look at me because
of my wheelchair.
.... The employees of the courtroom came back to
me and told me, "you are not the norm. You are not the
normal person we see every day." 222
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the in
addition to barring intentional discrimination, "[d]iscrimination against
the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product,
not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference -
of benign neglect." 223 Therefore, individuals with disabilities have
confronted, even in the "access to the court" setting, intentional
discrimination, the denial of auxiliary aids and services, the failure to
make modifications, and stereotypical assumptions. All forms of
discrimination must come to an end.
Whatever the outcome in Lane, state and local governments are
on notice that inaccessible courthouses and courtrooms will not be
tolerated. Moreover, courts will not be able to ignore that access is a
right in light of the attention that the Lane case has drawn, as evidenced
by the various amicus briefs filed in support of the respondents in the
case.224 The statutory and regulatory basis for the notion that courtrooms
222. Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing on
H. R. 4498 Before the House Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. On Educ. and Labor,
100th Cong. 41-42 (1989) (statement of Emeka Nwojke, Assistant Director, Northeast
Independent Living Program).
223. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294 n.7.
224. See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, 2003 WL 22733905 (Nov. 12, 2003).
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should be accessible to all citizens is clear, and the result is that so many
individuals with disabilities have prevailed-with a great deal of hard
work by themselves and their advocates-when suing the states and
counties over this fundamental principle.
Notwithstanding some disappointments, the obvious trend in
litigation involving "access to the courts" for individuals with disabilities
indicates that future plaintiffs in these cases will be successful. Further,
the lessons learned in "access to the court" cases serve the disability
community well in other instances, such as reasonable accommodations
in employment, auxiliary aids and services in education, challenging
stereotypical notions about the abilities of individuals with disabilities in
both employment and education contexts.
Hopefully, plaintiffs in courthouse and courtroom access cases
will continue to prevail against state and local governments. Even better,
perhaps litigation of these cases will cease as courts begin to provide
meaningful access to all who are entitled to it. When that happens, we
can finally get on to the business of why the individuals with disabilities
are in court in the first place.
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